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Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies - What U.S. Enterprises Must Do To 
Maintain Global Competitiveness. 
Problem Statement 
This project proposes to identify numerous Japanese monopolistic 
manufacturing activities and how those activities can be addressed by U.S. 
enterprises through effective strategic management plans. With this goal in 
mind, one could also ask several questions about what, if anything, the federal 
government should do to aid U.S. enterprises. Should the federal government 
play a role in high-tech markets? Should it protect U.S.-based firms competing in 
strategically important industries? Should it attempt to preserve a U.S. industrial 
presence in consumer electronics? Should it devise new institutions for assisting 
industrial efforts to commercialize technology? As evidence of declining U.S. 
industrial strength in high-tech markets grows, these and similar questions are 
asked with increasing intensity.' 
At an aggregate level, the problem of U.S. industrial competitiveness is 
nearly hidden from view. The full extent of the competitiveness problem begins 
to reveal itself only when we consider U.S. industry performance in a critical 
subset of high-technology markets - markets such as consumer electronics, 
factory automation, semiconductor memories, and advanced displays. In these 
'.Stuart Hart, "How Strategy-Making Processes Can Make a Difference," Strateqic 
Manaaement Journal, May 1994,251-255. 
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markets, Japanese competitors have established strong positions, and U.S. 
firms have fared poorly. The significance of the U.S. position is not simply that 
Japanese firms have achieved leadership in large and rapidly growing markets, 
but that these large and rapidly growing markets are themselves driving 
advances in important related markets. 
Despite repeated predictions that the high yen would drive Japan's export 
industries to the wall, not a single significant Japanese manufacturing company 
has gone out of business in recent years. What's sustaining Japan's export 
boom? The answer is fairly simple: in a wide range of important products, the 
Japanese are now the world's only significant suppliers. Many of these products 
are virtually invisible to the American public because they are high-tech 
materials, components or production machinery, but without them many 
American and European corporations would literally have to shut down. By 
establishing leadership in such products, Japan's keiretsus have come to 
dominate the upper reaches of the world manufacturing hierarchy and thus enjoy 
strong price leadership in a wide range of downstream activities.' 
Thanks to the increasing importance of research and development in 
advanced manufacturing, the ownership of industries is becoming more and 
more concentrated. In many key products, the world is down to just one or two 
suppliers. For example, lithographic machines, known as "steppers," perform 
some of the most sophisticated work in the semiconductor manufacturing 
'~arah Moore, 'Making Sense of Strategic Management: Towards a Constructive 
Guide," Manaaement Decision, January 1995, 19-24. 
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industry. Fifteen years ago the stepper market was fiercely contested by 
manufacturers in both Japan and the United States. Today just one Japanese 
company, Nikon, accounts for approximately 70 percent of the global market. 
The only other major supplier is Canon, another Japanese company. The full 
significance of Japan's leadership in steppers becomes apparent only when one 
realizes that advances in the semiconductor industry are paced by advances in 
stepper technology. The more accurate the stepper, the finer the lines that can 
be printed on a silicon chip and the more memory the chip can contaim3 
Not all the world's monopoly industries are located in Japan. But Japan 
has been targeting such monopoly niches for many years. Interestingly, they are 
invisible monopolies. Apart from a few well-known categories such as cameras 
and fax machines, Japan's areas of monopolistic strength are rarely easy to 
identify. This is because neither the Japanese nor their rapidly downsizing 
customers in U.S. manufacturing like to acknowledge how hollowed out the 
American economy has increasingly become. In many industries dominated by 
the Japanese, U.S. corporations seem quite strong. But this is an optical illusion. 
Unbeknownst to the American public, U.S. corporations quietly source critical 
components or even whole products from Japanese competitors. 
A good example is laser printers, whose defining laser components are 
built almost exclusively by the Japanese. Even Hewlett-Packard, which ironically 
has often been praised for its success in besting the Japanese, depends 
3~onald Bates, "Wanted: A Strategic Planner for the 1 99O9s," Journal of General 
Manaaement, Autumn 1992, 51-53. 
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critically on Japan's Canon for key components. Only when unforeseen 
circumstances disrupt the world's supplies does the existence of Japan's 
monopolies emerge. This was how word got out that Japan monopolizes a 
special steel needed to make valve springs for auto engines. For several weeks 
in January and February of 1995, this ultra-high-performance steel was in short 
supply because the Kobe, Japan earthquake had knocked out a Kobe steel plant 
that accounted for nearly 60 percent of the world's supply. Production was 
quickly restored and emergency action by other Japanese suppliers reduced any 
serious effects on the auto industry. But as the U.S. auto industry noted to its 
discomfort, all the alternative suppliers were also Japanese. There are many 
other critical areas where Japan enjoys a monopoly or near monopoly p~sit ion.~ 
4~amonn Fingleton, "The Tokyo Gambit," Financial World, 20 June 1995,22-26. 
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Chapter II  
Literature Review 
Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies - What U.S. Enterprises Must Do To 
Maintain Global Competitiveness. 
Literature Review 
Japan's economic leaders aim to establish monopolistic leadership in 
advanced industries. Their success to date has been greater than most 
Americans realize and constitutes one of Japan's greatest hidden strengths. 
How many economically significant monopolies does Japan now have? As this 
question has never been studied systematically by government officials or 
scholars, one can only guess. It seems reasonable to assume that monopolistic 
leadership is a factor in about one-third of Japan's exports. 
Corporate Japan's most important area of monopolistic leadership is 
electronics. The seeds of monopoly which Japan has planted here promise a 
truly exceptional harvest. The Japanese technology expert Masanori Moritani 
has perhaps put it most succinctly, "The silicon revolution," he says, "promises 
as big a transformation in the world economy as all other technologies 
developed since the eighteenth century put together." This is quite a statement, 
but the evidence that it is true is widely apparent to anyone who has looked at 
how corporate Japan's control of the electronics industry is giving it growing 
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power to shape dozens of other industries, from robotics and factory automation 
to cars and aerospace.' 
Monopolies of the Electronics Industry 
Listed below are several "advantageous positions" that Japanese 
companies control in the electronics industry: 
Flat panel displays. Japan dominates the industry, especially in large 
high-end products such as thin-film transistor liquid crystal displays. These are 
the most familiar as the screens in laptop computers, but they are now 
indispensable in a wide range of applications not visible to the consumer. Their 
weight-saving possibilities have made them essential equipment in military and 
commercial aircraft. According to independent consultants, demand is likely to 
triple, to about $20 billion, by the year 2000. The United States largest maker of 
flat-panel displays, Planar Technologies, accounts for only 3 percent of the 
world market. Moreover, like Korean flat-panel makers, it depends on the 
Japanese for key inputs such as flat-panel drivers and raw liquid crystal. 
Laser diodes. These are already indispensable in compact disk players 
and laser printers and now they are critical components for the new multimedia 
industry. Japan's global market share is more than 99 percent. Sharp 
Corporation's share alone is 40 percent. 
Compact disk players and CD-ROM drives. Compact disk players need no 
introduction; their more advanced derivatives CD-ROM (compact disk read-only 
5~olomon Brothers Research, Forbes, 13 November 1989. 
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memory) drives are becoming well known because they are a core technology of 
the multimedia revolution. Sony has about 40 percent of the global CD-ROM 
market. Other Japanese makers control the rest.6 
Capacitors. Murata makes 50 percent of the world's multi-layered ceramic 
capacitors, which are essential in almost all electronic devices, and 80 percent 
of the world's ceramic filters. 
Semiconductor materials and equipmenf. Japan's share of the 
semiconductor materials industry rose from 21 percent in 1980 to 73 percent in 
1990 and is still rising. Japan's market share appears to be at least 80 percent in 
several crucial items including ceramic substrates, silicon wafers, and bonding 
wire. Japan also monopolizes the supply of copper foil for printed circuit boards. 
Disco Corporation makes 70 percent of dicing saws for cutting silicon wafers. 
Two-thirds of the world's quartz masks are made by Hoya, more than 50 percent 
of photoresists by Tokyo Ohka Kogyo, and 40 percent of photomasks by Dai 
Nippon Printing. 
Cellular phones and pagers. A key area of Japanese dominance in 
cellular phones is gallium arsenide chips, which operate at higher frequencies 
and consume less power than silicon chips. Oki Electric is increasing its gallium 
arsenide capacity by 50 percent in 1995 to keep up with booming demand. 
Corporate Japan is believed to monopolize the market in surface acoustic wave 
devices used in cellular phones. 
6 Stuart Aurbach, "Sweating Bullets," Washinaton Post, 25 March 1991. 
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Optical character recognition. Optical scanning equipment allows postal 
services automatically to sort letters. It is also installed in automated ticket 
barriers in the world's most advanced subway systems and in vending and 
change-making machines that accept bank notes. Much of the software in these 
machines is made in the United States and other Western countries, but the 
crucial hardware is almost entirely Japanese. The major manufacturer is 
Toshiba, which got its start in a MITI-sponsored research cartel in the 1960's. 
Japan also leads in supermarket scanner technology. 
Lithographic Sfeppers. These precision machines are vital for making 
semi-conductors and liquid crystal displays. Nikon enjoys close to 70 percent of 
the booming market for steppers; Canon has almost all the rest. ' 
Monopolies of Other Industries 
Outside the electronics field, The following sectors have been identified 
as several of Japan's most important areas of monopolistic leadership: 
The information highway. Although American commentators think of the 
information highway as an American stronghold, Japan will make much of the 
relevant hardware, including many of the sophisticated asynchronous 
transmission mode (ATM) switching systems at the heart of interactive television. 
The Japanese have leveraged their expertise in video compression to lead a 
new international consortium that will own most of the patents for future video 
compression systems: of the eight companies participating in this consortium, 
 a avid Hamilton, "Specialty Materials," Asian Wall Street Journal, 30 August 1993. 
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four are Japanese (Sony, Matsushita Electric, Fujitsu, and Mitsubishi Electric), 
two are American (AT&T and General Instrument), and two are European 
(Thomson and Philips). 
Micro-engineering. Japan's micro-engineering expertise is easy to 
overlook but it has enabled Japan to establish several important monopolies in 
electro-mechanical components. Such components often must be machined to 
tolerances measured in microns, or, millionths of a meter. Such precision is a 
key reason for the superior reliability of, for example, Japanese videocassette 
recorders (whose magnetic heads and drums contain dozens of tiny moving 
parts which wear out quickly if they are not precisely aligned). Olympus Optical 
recently announced a grinder that grinds steel to a tolerance of one-fiftieth of a 
micron.' 
Auto parts. America is hardly extinct in auto parts, but Japan leads in 
miniaturization. As moving parts get ever smaller, problems of heat and wear are 
correspondingly multiplied. The Japanese are acknowledged masters in making 
materials which beat these problems. Miniaturization skills helped Japan 
establish an effective global monopoly in motorcycles by the early 1970's. 
Another important area of Japanese leadership is small compressors for 
automobile air-conditioning systems. Japan leads in sensors, displays, gauges, 
and other electronic components, which now account for between 5 and 10 
percent of the cost of a typical car. The Japanese reputedly have a lock on 
8~olomon Brothers Research, Forbes, 13 November 1989. 
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plastic optical fibers for controlling a car's electronics; compared to traditional 
wires, optical fibers provide important weight and space reductions. The 
Japanese reportedly lead in critical future technologies such as lean-burn 
chemical catalysts, high-capacity batteries, piezoelectric vibrating gyroscopes 
(for navigation systems), and ceramic engine parts (which will improve efficiency 
by allowing engines to operate without cooling ~ a t e r ) . ~  
Auto industry manufacturing machinery. Much was made recently of 
Chrysler's Neon car, which was described by press commentators as Chrysler's 
"Japanese car killer." Most reports overlooked the fact that the Neon, like most 
other advanced American cars, is made using Japanese presses and other 
sophisticated production equipment. Although Schuler of Germany is still a 
player in large presses for the auto industry, the category is now led by Japan's 
Komatsu. Japan leads in so-called squeeze-mold techniques for the mass 
production of strong, precisely engineered aluminum sub-components. Honda is 
the world expert in using aluminum in engines.'' 
Micro-motors. Precise, powerful micro-motors are an important edge for 
Japan in everything from cameras to CD-ROMs and laptop computers. Most 
micro-motors are made in East Asia using specialized Japanese manufacturing 
'~ajirne Karatsu, Nikkei Weekly, 9 June 1994. 
'O~red Bleakley, "Auto Industry Manufacturing Machinery," Asian Wall Street Journal, 
28 June 1993. 
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technology. Mabuchi Motor now makes 900 million micro-motors a year, 
approximately one for every household in the world." 
Bearings. Invisible to the consumer, bearings are a crucial area of 
Japanese leadership. They are most familiar as ball bearings, but they come in 
many specialized varieties. Bearings are used to relieve friction in virtually every 
mechanical process, and Japanese bearings are now vital in precision- 
engineering applications from videocassette recorders to fighter jets. Because 
bearings must combine extreme hardness with precise engineering, they are 
made in highly specialized factories, and monopolistic pressures have always 
been powerful in the industry. In recent years Japanese companies have 
leapfrogged over the American and Swedish companies that previously 
dominated the industry, and the United States now imports about 80 percent of 
its bearings. Just how strong the monopolistic pressures are in this industry can 
be gauged from the story of New Hampshire Ball Bearings, an American defense 
supplier that was taken over by Japan's Minebea in 1985. The takeover was 
controversial because America's ball bearing capacity had already fallen too low 
to meet surge production needs of a conventional war. But Ronald Reagan 
personally decided to approve the takeover in an effort to boost then Prime 
Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone's standing in Japan. Although Minebea had 
undertaken to expand in the United States, it instead quickly cut back and 
allegedly started importing East Asian ball bearings that were repackaged as 
"~ames Fallows, Lookina at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic and 
Political System, (New York: Pantheon Press, 1994), 423. 
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American-made. Why would Minebea risk offending the United States in such a 
serious way? Much of the answer lies in the ball bearing industry's huge 
monopolistic pressures that make it unprofitable to operate duplicate factories. 
Cameras. The camera industry is a classic Japanese monopoly and it has 
conferred classic monopolistic advantages on the Japanese economy. Thanks to 
leadership in cameras, Japan rapidly ascended the learning curve in lenses and 
miniature motors and thus surpassed the Americans in copiers, semiconductor- 
making equipment, laptop computers, television broadcasting equipment, and a 
host of other seemingly unrelated products that depend on camera technology. 
Copiers. The world leaders are the Japanese companies Canon, Ricoh, 
and Tokyo-based Fuji Xerox. Many of the sophisticated parts in American-brand 
copiers are made in ~apan." 
Carbon fiber. Stronger than steel and lighter than aluminum, carbon fiber 
has long been a vital material in aviation. Engineers approximate that carbon 
fiber components typically reduce a plane's total weight by 8 to 9 percent, a key 
advantage in fuel economy and, in the case of warplanes, in range and 
maneuverability. Japan is believed to enjoy a monopoly in the special source 
material from which most carbon fiber is made. Moreover, Japan specializes in 
new low-cost versions of carbon fiber which are expected to make substantial 
inroads into the auto industry.13 
 om Forester, Silicon Samurai, (New York: Oxford Press, 1993), 129. 
13carbon Fiber: Holding the Edae, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office) 
1989,138. 
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Titanium. Sumitomo Sitix is the world's leading producer of this 
increasingly important metal. Titanium's lightness and corrosion resistance make 
it a vital metal in aircraft, chemical plants, nuclear power stations, desalination 
plants, space and underwater exploration, automobile manufacturing, and 
offshore oil prod~ction.'~ 
14~amonn Fingleton, Blindside, (New York: Buttonwood Press, 1995), 68-80. 
13 
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Data Gathering Methodologies and Procedures 
Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies - What U.S. Enterprises Must Do To 
Maintain Global Competitiveness. 
Data Gathering Methodologies and Procedures 
This project will address this topic with a literature review of published 
information available from public and university libraries, and strategic 
management databases available from global lnternet sources. 
Location of the Information 
The secondary sources of information -journals and industry publications 
- are available at the library of Florida Atlantic University, the library of Lynn 
University, and the Palm Beach County Public Library. Global lnternet sources 
will be tapped using Florida Atlantic University's VAX computer and Telnet 
resources. Database search tools Gopher, Veronica, and Archie will be used to 
access resources available from national lnternet locations. 
Obtaining the Information 
No complications exist with obtaining the secondary information for this 
project. All of the information will be secured from the stacks of the library of 
Florida Atlantic University, the library of Lynn University , and the Palm Beach 
County Public Library. The material will be reviewed and photocopies of 
whatever material requiring further study will be secured. 
Chapter IV 
Results 
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Chapter IV 
Results 
Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies - What U.S. Enterprises Must Do To 
Maintain Global Competitiveness. 
Results 
The major difficulty in identifying Japan's monopolies is that statistics in 
this area are often misleading; qualitative factors are involved to an 
extraordinary degree. To assess the degree of monopoly one must, for example, 
distinguish between different production technologies. Often where the 
Japanese have a real monopoly, the Americans still can claim a presence. 
Typically one American supplier remains in any particular category who uses 
"handmade" production techniques for special-order military applications, while 
leaving the vast consumer market entirely to a Japanese cartel. 
Many of Japan's monopolies are so obscure that they are virtually 
invisible to American executives and government officials. An example is a 
substance known as epoxy cresol novolac resin, an ingredient in most 
semiconductors. Almost no one in the United States had heard of this substance 
before 1993, but things changed fast when an explosion disabled a small factory 
in the remote Japanese town of Niihama. As astonished American 
semiconductor executives quickly discovered, the factory accounted for nearly 
65 percent of the entire world supply. 
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Prices of some types of semiconductors doubled on the world market in 
the following two weeks. Within a month, the Clinton administration was pressing 
the Japanese to take emergency action to restore production. The closer 
American officials looked at the epoxy story, the more worried they became. 
They found that the Japanese also monopolized both the substance known as 
resolving silica, with which the epoxy is mixed before being incorporated in 
semiconductors, and the process by which resolving silica and epoxy are mixed. 
Thus three links of the manufacturing "food chain" in one hitherto unsung 
subdivision of the semiconductor industry had been monopolized by corporate 
Japan. Moreover, an alternative technology called ceramic packaging is also a 
Japanese monopoly. 
In the wake of the Niihama disaster, top American companies like DuPont 
and Monsanto were urged to get into the business, but they didn't want to 
compete in a Japan-dominated product category. Why did the Niihama explosion 
come as such a surprise to the United States? In mapping gaps in America's 
technology food chain, Americans have focused narrowly on a few "critical" 
technologies of compelling importance to American military security while 
ignoring unglamorous civilian technologies. Yet these civilian technologies 
account for a much larger share of world economic output. 
Another problem in measuring Japanese monopoly is American 
corporations' increasing secrecy about their dependence on Japanese supplies.. 
The secrecy is understandable: because wages are now lower in the United 
Grayson Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies 
States than in Japan, American employers who fire American workers in order to 
source from Japan are implicitly confessing they have lost the technology race. 
American defense contractors seem particularly secretive, perhaps because 
they made large profits in the 1980's by relying on cut-rate components imported 
from Japan while turning their backs on struggling American suppliers. 
Another difficult qualitative question is to what extent control of apparently 
insignificant components gives Japan a monopoly in a whole industry. Does 
Japan monopolize the videocassette recorder industry? On paper, no: But in 
practice, probably yes, because non-Japanese makers are dependent on Japan 
for vital parts. In some industries dominated by corporate Japan, a few non- 
Japanese suppliers exist in Europe or East Asia. But often such suppliers are de 
facto junior partners in the Japanese cartels, and they are located in countries 
whose governments turn a blind eye to antitrust concerns. In general, once a 
Japanese cartel has captured at least 50 percent of the global market, it can be 
presumed to have established monopolistic leadership. 
Most Americans seem to think America's growing dependence on 
Japanese manufacturing is of little significance. Even the fact that America's 
most advanced weapons depend on Japanese components elicits no more than 
a shrug from the likes of the Brookings Institution and the Wall Street Journal. 
This is globalism, they seem to say; sit back and enjoy it! The complacency 
seems to stem from a view that "mutual dependencies" are unavoidable in the 
modern global economy. Just as America is becoming dependent on Japan for 
Grayson Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies 
some products, so Japan is supposedly becoming dependent on America for 
others.I5 
The truth is that the combination of a huge manufacturing work force and 
high productivity enable the Japanese economic system to aim for almost 
complete self-sufficiency in advanced manufacturing. In the last two decades 
Japan has reduced or eliminated its dependence on America in computers and 
computer components, telecommunications, machine tools, electronic 
manufacturing equipment, and robotics. Perhaps most significantly of all, the 
Japanese economic system has been working in a coordinated way to reduce 
Japan's dependence on America in aerospace, the last significant manufacturing 
industry that America leads. Rather than buy American warplanes, for instance, 
Japan decided in the late 1980's to build its own. 
One reason American policy-makers have been unconcerned about the 
1 
loss of American manufacturing power is that they believe the United States can 
easily get back into lost industries "in a matter of weeks" in an emergency. This 
theory has gone largely unchallenged because there are few hard numbers in 
the public domain that would allow academic economists to evaluate it. 
On the rare occasions when the theory has been tested by events, 
however, it has proved startlingly one-sided. One such occasion was the 
Toshiba military secrets scandal of the 1980's. A Toshiba subsidiary was found 
to have sold crucial machine tools to the Soviet defense industry. The United 
isphilip Trezise, Brooking Review, Winter 1989190, 12. 
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States wanted to retaliate by boycotting Toshiba products, but it quickly 
discovered it could not do so because many major American manufacturers were 
critically dependent on Toshiba for components. There followed one of the most 
humiliating episodes in American business history as such high-technology 
corporations as AT&T, Hewlett-Packard, and Apple Computer lobbied Capitol 
Hill in Toshiba's behalf. Although the companies were understandably 
embarrassed to associate their names with such a controversial cause they felt 
they had no choice. The estimated damage Toshiba's action had inflicted on 
American defenses had been estimated as high as $30 billion. In the end, 
Toshiba escaped with a slap on the wrist.'" 
An even more significant admission of American dependency came in the 
early 1990's, after the small company Japan Aviation Electronics Industry was 
indicted by the United States Justice Department for selling defense technology 
to Iran. This time, the company turned out to be so important to America's 
defense strategy that the United States Defense Department quickly stepped in 
to plead successfully to get it off the hook. The message of the Toshiba and 
Japan Aviation incidents is clear: Japan's manufacturing prowess is rapidly 
becoming a vital tool of global power. 
These monopoly positions are crucial to Japan's overall exports. About 
one third of Japan's exports consist of goods in which Japan has a monopolistic 
"pat Choate, Agent of Influence, Agents of Influence: How Japan's Lobbyists in the 
United States Manipulate America's Political and Economic System, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 
1990), 8. 
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lead, up from about a tenth in 1980. Moreover, in many downstream industries 
where the U.S. and Europe are apparently strong, the Japanese hold the upper 
hand by virtue of upstream monopolies. Thanks to many critical strengths in 
producing auto-making equipment and advanced components, the Japanese 
have been far less pressured by the high yen than many analysts predicted. 
Japan's monopolistic strengths have played a key role in bolstering the 
earnings of most of Japan's major export corporations. As a result Japan's 
corporate profits have been holding up well despite the rising yen. 
Recently, there has been a rising challenge to Japan's monopoly 
positions from other east Asian countries. But the Japanese have shown a 
remarkable ability to jump to higher levels of monopolistic leadership when their 
existing monopolies are cha~lenged.'~ 
17~ingleton, "Tokyo Gambit," 24-26. 
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Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies -What U.S. Enterprises Must Do To 
Maintain Global Competitiveness. 
Discussion I Conclusion 
U.S. industry still leads the world in the production of manufactured goods 
by a substantial margin, accounting for 30.6 percent of total manufacturing 
production among OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) member countries, compared to 21.6 percent for Japan. The U.S. 
share of total OECD production in high technology however, is shrinking (from 
40 percent in 1980 to 36 percent in 1990), while Japan's is growing (from 18 
percent to 29 percent), but here again, the aggregate data show no sign of 
serious difficulty. 
The full extent of the competitiveness problem begins to reveal itself only 
when one considers U.S. industry performance in a critical subset of high- 
technology markets. The significance of this is not simply that Japanese firms 
have achieved leadership in large and rapidly growing markets, but that these 
large and rapidly growing markets are themselves driving advances in important 
related markets. Semiconductors and displays are the building blocks for 
electronic equipment. They represent an increasingly large portion of the total 
value added in a growing range of high-volume, fast-growing products, such as 
laptop computers, fax machines, compact disc players, camcorders, and 
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portable telephones. By dominating semiconductor memory and display markets, 
Japanese firms build the foundation for dominance in electronic equipment 
markets. Once leadership in equipment markets is established, it reinforces 
leadership in  component^.'^ 
Here then can be seen the full range of the competitiveness problem. The 
strongest Japanese competitors are focusing on large, fast-growing industries 
that are the foundation for even larger, more widespread, future industries, and 
when U.S. firms go head to head against their Japanese counterparts in those 
industries, most fare poorly. The real issue in competitiveness is not leadership 
in the aggregate, but leadership where it matters most. The cause for alarm is 
not the marginal decline in U.S. industry's share of overall global production but 
the striking failures in specific domains of long-term strategic importance.lg 
Technology Leadership 
What can government do to help U.S.-based firms compete in global 
markets? 
Build advantage through technology leadership. Better technology leads 
to superior products at lower or competitive costs, which in turn offsets the 
structural advantages enjoyed by the competition. The same is true for most U.S. 
companies competing in high-tech markets. A primary objective for U.S. policy- 
"~oseph Morone and Damian Saccocio, "A Success-Based Competitiveness Policy," 
Issues in Science and Technoloqy, Winter 1992/93,62. 
Igsteven Schlosstein, 'High Noon for the Rising Sun," Journal of Business Strateay, 
October 1993,4449. 
22 
Grayson Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies 
makers should therefore be to help firms build and maintain technology 
leadership. 
Technology leadership is driven by competition. If there remains a serious 
obstacle in the U.S. to continuous improvement in cost and performance, it lies 
not in the financial environment or the managerial practices reinforced by that 
environment, but in the government mission-oriented culture that still 
predominates in U.S. research institutions. The culture of technology 
development and engineering in agencies such as the Department of Defense, 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Department of Energy 
emphasizes one-of-a-kind, high performance systems that require customized, 
and often manual, manufacturing - precisely the reverse of the demands placed 
on high-tech firms competing head to head with the Japanese. 20 
Technology leadership begins with creative and well-trained individuals 
pursuing radical and generational innovation. To many observers, the solution is 
simple; more interactions between industry and universities and fewer between 
universities and the government-agency culture. The more university-based 
science and engineering are oriented to problems of importance to industry, the 
more likely it is that students will be exposed to the need to balance high 
performance with low cost, and elegant design with manufa~turability.~' 
*'~lexander Tulloch, "The Strategic Management of Change," Manaaement Decision, 
May 1993,62-65. 
21~illiarn Starbuck, "Strategizing in the Real World," International Journal of 
Technologv Management, February 1993,77-83. 
23 
Grayson Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies 
Success offers a clear and consistent message: Technology leadership is 
shaped by general management - by the strategic focus that it displays, by the 
consistency with which it applies that focus, by its pursuit of total rather than just 
high-end leadership, by its willingness and ability to pioneer continuous as well 
as discontinuous improvements in technology, and by a style of decision-making 
that is characterized by a willingness to learn by doing in the face of uncertainty 
and that is driven by the imperative to stay ahead rather than by financial 
If technology leadership is shaped by general management, two logically 
distinct approaches could be to: 
Change the financial environment. Sustained leadership in high-tech 
markets requires the ability to periodically renew businesses by pioneering 
radical and generational innovations. This ability requires general management 
that is willing and able to persist through decade-long periods of low or negative 
returns coupled with high investment. This does not mean that continuous 
incremental innovation within existing businesses is unimportant. But leadership 
cannot be maintained if it is not first established and then periodically renewed 
through the much more ambitious, risky, and painful discontinuous innovations. 
Changing managerial practices directly. A different but complementary 
approach is to devise policies similar to R&D and investment tax credits that 
would directly influence managerial behavior. To be effective, any such 
22 Suresh Kotha, "Strategic Action Generation," Stratesic Manasernent Journal, March 
1995,24-25. 
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measures must have a significant impact on cash flow. The 25 percent tax credit 
on increases in R&D spending that was instituted in 1981 has too small an effect 
on cash flow to significantly alter a manager's decisions. And even if a larger 
R&D tax credit were instituted, it still might not induce the kind of long-term- 
oriented action required to build technology leadership, since in their current 
form, R&D tax credits can just as easily be used to subsidize minor modifications 
of existing  product^.'^ 
Effective Strategic Planning 
What must U.S. enterprises do to help themselves compete in global 
markets? 
Among the many alternatives, strategic planning has been a highly 
successful method of competing in an ever-changing global marketplace. 
Strategic planning is the identification and creation of competitive advantage. It 
deals with the development of brand positioning as a central focus and the 
necessary tools to make that focus live; to secure resources and commitment; to 
monitor progress and help understand and embody external influences and 
changesz4 The systematic approach to the planning process is key and involves 
the following areas of concentration: the marketing audit, a thorough analysis of 
both internal and external environments; SWOT analysis, examining the key 
conditions of the product, the market and the competition; defining new 
23~orone, Saccocio, "A Success-Based Competitiveness Policy," 65-66. 
2 4 ~ .  Elango, "Managing Strategic Flexibility: Key to Effective Performance," Journal of 
General Manaaernent, Spring 1995,60-67. 
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objectives; determining the best ways to meet these objectives; and finally, how 
will they be rneas~red.'~ 
Strategic planning is about the future development of a product or 
company and therefore must contain vision, as it is vision which provides the 
context for growth. Marketing by existing conditions has very limited growth 
opportunity, particularly as so few categories are experiencing incremental 
volume gains. Often the planning process does not allow for plans to extend 
beyond the immediate year ahead, as the management mindset is one of results, 
results, results, and yet in so many cases a 3-or-5 year plan is essential to 
defining how a product or technology will evolve. This is not to say that plans 
should not change as times and conditions change. On the contrary, products 
can be long-term equities that corporations should nurture carefully. The 
planning document, and in particular the positioning statement, needs to be 
reviewed constantly. It has to be a working document, an operational blueprint, 
not a "file-fi~ler".'~ 
Japan and the United States will continue to compete and there will 
always be a leader in that competition. It will depend on the decision makers of 
America's production industries to make the decisive moves that will help 
improve American competitiveness on a global scale. 
25~ernard Reirnan, "The New Strategic Leadership," Plannina Review, October 1994, 
6. 
26~hornas Renda, "Are Your Organization and Business Strategies at Odds?," 
Supervisorv Manapernent, March 1994,lO-12. 
References 
Grayson Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies 
References 
Aurbach, Stuart. "Sweating Bullets." Washington Post, 25 March 1991. 
Contained specific information related to CD-ROM technology and 
the Japanese hold on that technology. 
Bates, Donald. "Wanted: A Strategic Planner for the 1990's." Journal of General 
Management, Autumn 1992, 51 -53. 
A fact filled article that contains data specifically related to the 
lithographic stepper industry. An essential industry for computer 
enterprises. 
Bleakley, Fred. "Auto Industry Manufacturing Machinery." Asian Wall Street 
Journal, 28 June 1993. 
The Journal always keeps abreast of the major changes in many 
industries, the auto industry is no exception. This article discussed the 
stranglehold that many Japanese parts manufacturers maintain on a 
global perspective. 
Carbon Fiber: Holding the Edge. (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office) 1989, 138. 
Government publication that discusses the uses and future 
potential of carbon fiber and the technology that is required in its 
production. Japan is identified as a major U.S. supplier with no other 
major U.S. producers. 
Choate, Pat. Agent of Influence, Agents of Influence: How Japan's Lobbyists in 
the United States Manipulate America's Political and Economic System. 
(New York: Alfred Knopf, 1990), 8. 
Another perspective of how the economic and political system of 
the U.S. is up for sale. This work sets the stage for how Japan uses all 
avenues of ingress to develop the monopolies that they will control in the 
future. 
Elango, B. "Managing Strategic Flexibility: Key to Effective Performance." 
Journal of General Management, Spring 1995, 60-67. 
Discussion of senior management's need to concentrate on 
introducing strategic flexibility in their organizations. Strategic flexibility 
Grayson Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies 
enables an organization to quickly take advantage of external 
opportunities, which is a necessity in improving profit levels in a volatile 
international business environment. In my opinion, flexibility and 
adaptability is paramount for success. 
Fallows, James. Looking at the Sun: The Rise of the New East Asian Economic 
and Political System. (New York: Pantheon Press, 1994), 423. 
A comprehensive work that attempts to identify the methods and 
strategies employed by Japanese executives to gain economic 
domination. Looking at the Sun was instrumental in helping to identify 
what is actually transpiring in the game of world politics and economics. 
Fingleton, Eamonn. "The Tokyo Gambit." Financial World, 20 June 1995,22-26. 
Article witten by longtime Japan resident who helps to identify 
Japanese world monopolies. His insight into the Japanese culture helps 
westerners understand the Japanese business mentality. 
Fingleton, Eamonn. Blindside. (New York: Buttonwood Press, 1995), 68-80. 
Comprehensive work that intensifies its focus on the subtleties of 
Japanese culture and the misunderstandings and misinterpretations of 
the western press. How those misinterpretations have allowed Japanese 
industries to gain deep inroads into what was formerly U.S. industry 
dominated territories. 
Forester, Tom. Silicon Samurai. (NewYork: Oxford Press, 1993), 129. 
A work that gives an in-depth view how silicon and silicon 
technologies are employed in the all-encompassing computer industry. An 
intense perspective of how Japan dominates the silicon industry and how 
it plans to maintain its dominance. 
Hamilton, David. "Specialty Materials." Asian Wall Street Journal, 30 August 
1993. 
Article highlighting lithographic stepper technology. Discusses how 
Japan dominates the stepper market. 
Hart, Stuart. "How Strategy-making Processes Can Make a Difference." Strategic 
Management Journal, May 1994,251 -255. 
Grayson Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies 
Article that asks tough questions and suggests methods of 
improvement for small and large companies. Useful for this project 
to give greater depth to the choices involved in making a strategy 
decision. 
Karatsu, Hajime. Nikkei Weekly, 9 June 1994. 
Auto parts industry in Japan is one of the strongest in the 
world. Japan supplies parts to all major manufacturers and 
maintains strong links with their secondary parts markets. 
Kotha, Suresh. "Strategic Action Generation." Strategic Management Journal, 
March 1995, 24-25. 
Another series of excellent strategy suggestions. Useful due 
to its more aggressive policy suggestions. 
Moore, Sarah. "Making Sense of Strategic Management: Towards a Constructive 
Guide." Management Decision, January 1995, 19-24. 
The complexity of strategic planning is placing heavy 
cognitive demands on corporate strategists. This article helps to 
identify factors that make the strategic management process a 
required necessity for companies today. 
Morone, Joseph and Saccocio, Damian. "A Success-Based Competitiveness 
Policy." Issues in Science and Technology, Winter 1992193, 62. 
A discussion of the competitive issues involved in the business 
battles of the U.S. and Japan. An insightful article using facts gathered 
from U.S. government sources tracking the competitive struggle with 
Japan. 
Reiman, Bernard. "The New Strategic Leadership." Planning Review, October 
1994, 6. 
Strategic leadership provides organizations with a long-term vision 
that influences people toward achieving desired results. This article 
highlights a conference of The Planning Forum. Insights from leaders of 
business related to the necessity for strategic planning. 
Renda, Thomas. "Are Your Organization and Business Strategies at Odds?" 
Supervisory Management, March 1994, 10-12. 
Grayson Japanese Manufacturing Monopolies 
Companies succeed because they have well-planned strategies 
that are supported by systems which are consistent with these strategies. 
This article was useful in that it discussed several successful strategies of 
international businesses. 
Schlosstein, Steven. "High Noon for the Rising Sun." Journal of Business 
Strategy, October 1993, 44-49. 
Another discussion of the merits involved with long-term 
perspectives in business and the pitfalls involved with the short-sighted 
perspective. A useful insight to the competitive environment of 
international business. 
Solomon Brothers Research. Forbes, 13 November 1989. 
The data gathered by this firm helps companies worldwide make 
effective decisions based on accurate information. Data compiled relating 
to large Japanese organizations was extremely useful in helping to 
identify Japanese monopolies. 
Starbuck, William. "Strategizing in the Real World." International Journal of 
Technology Management, February 1993, 77-83. 
Strategic management is serious business. Strategy suggestions 
for American business. Techniques and policies to improve international 
business competitiveness. 
Trezise, Philip. Brooking Review. Winter 1989190, 12. 
An interesting perspective from the American think tanks. Let the 
market leader dominate the market no matter the circumstance, the true 
economists perspective. This article supplies a perspective that is 
predominant with the bottom-line short-termed perspective of typical 
American businesses. 
Tulloch, Alexander. "The Strategic Management of Change." Management 
Decision, May 1993, 62-65. 
A discussion of how U.S. business executive management and 
government policies currently operate. A method of operation that is 
restraining the full competitiveness capabilities of American businesses. 
Suggestions for managerial change. 
